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A central feature of our consciousness is the experience of the self as a unified entity
residing in a physical body, termed bodily self-consciousness. This phenomenon includes
aspects such as the sense of owning a body (also known as body ownership) and
has been suggested to arise from the integration of sensory signals from the body.
Several studies have shown that temporally synchronous tactile stimulation of the real
body and visual stimulation of a fake or virtual body can induce changes in bodily
self-consciousness, typically resulting in a sense of illusory ownership over the fake
body. The present study assessed the effect of anatomical congruency of visuo-tactile
stimulation on bodily self-consciousness. A virtual body was presented and temporally
synchronous visuo-tactile stroking was applied simultaneously to the participants’ body
and to the virtual body. We manipulated the anatomical locations of the visuo-tactile
stroking (i.e., on the back, on the leg), resulting in congruent stroking (stroking was
felt and seen on the back or the leg) or incongruent stroking (i.e., stroking was felt
on the leg and seen on the back). We measured self-identification with the virtual
body and self-location as well as skin temperature. Illusory self-identification with the
avatar as well as changes in self-location were experienced in the congruent stroking
conditions. Participants showed a decrease in skin temperature across several body
locations during congruent stimulation. These data establish that the full-body illusion (FBI)
alters bodily self-consciousness and instigates widespread physiological changes in the
participant’s body.
Keywords: bodily self-consciousness, body representation, body illusion, self-representation, body-ownership,
neuroscience robotics
INTRODUCTION
Since William James’s characterization of self-consciousness in
the 19th century (James, 1890/1950), the psychological “self” has
been the subject of much intrigue in the world of psychology, phi-
losophy, and more recently, neuroscience. It has been proposed
that the processing and integration of body-related information is
important to develop a comprehensive neurobiological model of
self-consciousness (Damasio, 2000; Jeannerod, 2006; Craig, 2009;
Blanke, 2012). Recent advances in virtual reality (VR) technolo-
gies have enabled the investigation of bodily self-consciousness
by providing subjects with ambiguous multisensory information
about the location and appearance of their own body (Serino
et al., 2008; Salomon et al., 2009, 2012). This has made it possi-
ble to study three important aspects of bodily self-consciousness
and how they relate to the processing of bodily signals: self-
identification with the body (the experience of owning a body),
self-location (the experience of where I am in space), and first-
person perspective (the experience of from where I perceive)
(Blanke, 2012; Pfeiffer et al., 2013).
Although the sense of owning a body is often taken for granted,
there are many cases of impaired sense of body ownership.
For example, neurological patients with damage in the parietal
lobe or insula will often neglect or deny ownership for body
parts, one side of the body, or the entire body (e.g., Karnath
et al., 2005; Vallar and Ronchi, 2009; Heydrich et al., 2010).
Recent research has shown that hand ownership can also be
manipulated in healthy individuals. Botvinick and Cohen’s dis-
covery of the rubber hand illusion (RHI) revealed that an illusory
ownership for a rubber hand arises when synchronous visuo-
tactile stimulation is administered to a person’s occluded hand
and that of a viewed rubber hand. This illusion is abolished
when the tactile stimulation on the person’s real hand is asyn-
chronous to the stimulation seen on the rubber hand (Botvinick
and Cohen, 1998) and can also be induced using VR tech-
nology (e.g., Slater et al., 2008; Evans and Blanke, 2013). As
in other multisensory illusions, where specific combinations of
multisensory information give rise to an erroneous subjective
perception (e.g., McGurk and Macdonald, 1976), bodily illu-
sions indicate states in which people report strong sensations
of erroneous bodily self-consciousness due to an experimental
manipulation of multisensory conflict between visual, propri-
oceptive, and tactile cues. The multisensory conflict between
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the visuo-tactile stimulation induces bodily illusions, reflecting
alterations of bodily self-consciousness (Ehrsson, 2007; Blanke,
2012).
The RHI allows to investigate the integration of visual, tac-
tile and proprioceptive signals and its importance for central
body representation. However, more recent studies have shown
that visuo-tactile mismatch may modify not only ownership
of a body part, but may also induce ownership for a fake or
virtual body (self-identification with a filmed or virtual body;
Ehrsson, 2007; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008), changes in self-
location (Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Aspell et al., 2009), and
changes in subjective first-person perspective (Ionta et al., 2011;
Pfeiffer et al., 2013). The latter paradigm (i.e., full-body illu-
sion, FBI) consists of participants viewing a video image on a
head mounted display (HMD) that was linked to a video cam-
era (placed 2m behind the person) filming the participant’s
back from behind. Participants thus viewed the video image
of their body while an experimenter stroked their back with a
stick (the stroking was perceived by the participants on their
back and also seen on the back of the virtual body). The HMD
displayed the stroking of the virtual body either in real time
or not (using an online video-delay or offline pre-recorded
data), generating synchronous and asynchronous visuo-tactile
stimulation.
The RHI and the FBI are most often quantified based on
participants’ responses to questionnaires and responses in dif-
ferent behavioral tasks. Several studies have shown that illusion
conditions can elicit a change in the perceived location of the
body or hand (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard,
2005; Lenggenhager et al., 2007), as well as changes in tactile
processing (Pavani et al., 2000; Aspell et al., 2009; Zopf et al.,
2010). Likewise, physiological measures have been employed and
revealed heightened skin conductance responses (SCR) in reac-
tion to threats to an illusorily embodied rubber hand (Armel
and Ramachandran, 2003) or body (e.g., Ehrsson, 2007; Petkova
and Ehrsson, 2008; Slater et al., 2008). The FBI has also been
shown to affect pain perception by increasing pain thresholds
(Hänsel et al., 2011). Additionally, differences in histamine reac-
tivity (Barnsley et al., 2011) and the cooling of the participant’s
hand during the RHI (Moseley et al., 2008) have been found
to accompany changes in illusory hand ownership. In summary,
both the RHI and the FBI have been associated with physiologi-
cal, behavioral, and tactile perceptual changes, whereas only the
RHI has been linked to physiological changes in temperature and
immune regulatory processes. These physiological changes have
been suggested to reflect parasympathetic changes related to the
modulations in body ownership. Such changes of temperature
regulation can be found in several clinical conditions associated
with disturbances in body ownership such as complex regional
pain syndrome (Jänig and Baron, 2003; Moseley, 2005), anorexia
(Lautenbacher et al., 1991), self-injurious behavior (Symons et al.,
2001) as well as others (for more details of such clinical condi-
tions see Table S1 in Moseley et al., 2008). It has been proposed
that these modulations of temperature related to body ownership
may bemediated though the insular cortex which has been shown
to be involved in illusions of body ownership (e.g., Tsakiris, 2010;
Blanke, 2012; Heydrich and Blanke, 2013) as well as coding of
introspective information (Craig et al., 2000; Damasio et al., 2000;
Craig, 2009).
While the FBI and the RHI are both induced by tempo-
rally synchronous visuo-tactile stroking of a seen body or hand
with the participant’s body or hand, the induced state of bod-
ily self-consciousness differs in several aspects. For example, the
RHI shows high sensitivity to both postural and anatomical con-
gruence (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Costantini and Haggard,
2007) as well as to the spatial distance between the seen and the
touched hand. Thus, one study tested the effects of varying dis-
tance between the viewed rubber hand and the real hand and
found that the illusion was strongest when the hands were near
to each other and decayed rapidly when they were moved apart
(Lloyd, 2007). Differently, FBIs can be induced when seeing a vir-
tual body from a body-centered viewpoint (Petkova et al., 2011),
but also from a distance (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al.,
2007). Furthermore, classical FBI and RHI paradigms compare
conditions in which a temporal conflict (and hence an anatomi-
cal conflict) exists (asynchronous visuo-tactile condition) to those
with neither temporal nor anatomical conflicts (synchronous
visuo-tactile conditions). However, to the best of our knowl-
edge no experiment has compared the effects of an anatomical
mismatch without any temporal conflict in the FBI.
Another difference between FBI and RHI relates to the
anatomical specificity of the illusion. Studies have shown that
during the RHI the proprioceptive drift may be constrained to
the specific being finger stroked (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005).
However, the FBI, in which participants are typically stroked
on their back, induces a change in self-location relating to the
full body and its position in space rather than only the stroked
region (Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Ionta et al., 2011). Recent find-
ings from skin temperature measurements in the RHI have also
shown a certain degree of specificity with decreased temperature
in the illusion condition only in the stroked hand, but not for
the contralateral hand nor for other non-stroked control sites
[i.e., the ipsilateral ankle; (Moseley et al., 2008)]. This provides
additional, physiological evidence that the RHI illusion induces a
local and anatomically specific change in embodiment. The FBI,
however, may induce a more widespread change in the body rep-
resentation (at the trunk and potentially beyond), although no
direct physiological evidence of such widespread changes has been
provided.
Here, a novel robotic device for tactile stimulation (Duenas
et al., 2011) is combined with VR to perform precise and repro-
ducible visuo-tactile manipulations of the FBI. The robotic device
was capable of independently stroking both the back (as in previ-
ous FBI studies) but also the legs, allowing us to explore if the
FBI can be evoked by stroking of the legs. We investigated the
following questions: Is anatomically congruent visuo-tactile stim-
ulation necessary for the induction of the FBI (as has been shown
previously for the RHI, but not yet tested for the FBI)? Would
the induction of the FBI be accompanied with skin tempera-
ture reduction and will the temperature reduction be widespread
or locally confined to the location of congruent visuo-tactile
stroking as has been shown for the RHI (Moseley et al., 2008)?
Participants were stroked by the robotic device on their back or
leg while seeing anatomically congruent or incongruent visual
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 65 | 2
Salomon et al. Illusorily embodiment and body temperature
feedback. Skin temperature, self-identification, self-location and
tactile perception were measured. We hypothesized that (1) self-
identification will be stronger during spatially-congruent versus
incongruent conditions, and that (2) these illusion-inducing con-
ditions will be associated with a reduction of skin temperature,
which unlike in the RHI (Moseley et al., 2008) will not be
specific to the location of visual tactile stimulation but rather
widespread throughout all four recording sites. Following the
results of Moseley et al. (2008) we expected that (3) response
times (RTs) in the speeded tactile reaction would be longer in
the congruent stroking conditions. Finally in line with previous
experiments (e.g., Lenggenhager et al., 2009) we expected (4) a
modulation of the RTs in the mental ball drop task as a function
of visual-tactile stroking congruency.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-two volunteers (14 male, 8 female, mean age = 22.1
years, SD = 2.3) participated in the study. Participants had nor-
mal or corrected to normal vision and gave written informed
consent. All participants were right handed. The study was per-
formed in accordance to the ethical standards of the Declaration
of Helsinki. The experimental protocol was approved by the
local ethics committee: La Commission d’ethique de la recherche
Clinique de la Faculte de Biologie et de Medecine—at the
University of Lausanne, Switzerland.
MATERIALS AND STIMULI
We used a robotic stroking device, which allows for the precise
application of tactile stimuli to ensure reproducibility and con-
sistency across the experimental conditions and participants. The
device used in this study is detailed in Duenas et al. (2011). In
brief, the stroking mechanism consists of four individual stim-
ulation modules—two at the back and two at the legs—driven
by four ultrasonic motors (Shinsei Corp., Japan) over a rack and
pinion gear. The stimulation modules move a polymer sphere
that contacts the body, held by a polymer spring blade which
ensures constant contact pressure (Figure 1C). Stroking move-
ment is position controlled with a sampling rate of 200Hz and
can be controlled at velocities of 2–12 cm/s. The four stroking
modules followed a sawtooth trajectory with a range of 20 cm for
back-stroking modules and 16 cm for leg-stroking modules (left
and right) at 0.4Hz. LabVIEW software (National Instruments
Corporation, version 2010b, www.ni.com/labview) was used to
control the robotic stroking device.
EXpyVR (Custom in house software, http://lnco.epfl.ch/
expyvr) was used for the programming and executing of the
experiment, and recording of RTs. Responses were collected using
a keypad (Targus Numeric Keypad AKP10US, www.targus.com).
Participants wore a V-Real Viewer 3D SVGAHMD (800× 600
resolution, 35◦ field of view, www.vrealities.com/virtualviewer3d.
html). On the HMD, participants viewed the virtual avatar from
behind, with an overlay of the position and range of stroking
FIGURE 1 | Experimental setup. (A) Picture of experimental setup.
Participant lying on robotic stroking device. (B) Robotic stoking device shown
from feet perspective. Top: padding removed for motor view. Bottom: robot
with padding as used in the experiment. (C) Schematic representation of
stroking regions (dashed red line), tactile vibrators (blue triangles), and
thermocouple placement (green x).
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corresponding to that of the robotic stroking modules (Duenas
et al., 2011; Ionta et al., 2011).
The participants were outfitted with four tactile vibrators at
the left back, right back, left leg, right leg. Each vibrator con-
sisted of a small vibrating motor (Precision MicroDrives shaftless
vibration motors, model 312).
Participants’ skin temperature was measured with a HH309A
Data Logger Thermometer (Omega, Stamford, USA) with four
type K thermocouples and a real-time clock. The skin tempera-
ture of participants were measured at four locations, 4 cm below
the tactile vibrators on the left back, right back, left leg, and right
leg. The temperature at each location was recorded every 2 s over
the entire course of each experimental block, with the start of
the experiment coinciding with the beginning of the temperature
recording. We tested the variance of the thermometer in seven
participants using the same locations and durations as used in the
experiment. The participants were lying in a relaxed supine posi-
tion without and visual or tactile stimulation. The mean variance
of skin temperature change was 0.0005◦C.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We used full-factorial design with a 2 (Visual Stroking: back, leg)
×2 (Tactile Stroking: back, leg) within-participant manipulation.
PROCEDURE
At the start of the experiment, participants were briefed about the
stimuli they were going to experience and observe, and instructed
on the different tasks they were to perform. All participants wore
a white t-shirt and black socks which allowed for the placement
of tactile vibrators and thermocouples on the skin. Participants
were placed in a supine position on the robotic stroking device
and wore a HMD covered by a black cloth to occlude peripheral
vision. Participants held a ball (12 cm diameter) in their left hand
and a response button device in their right hand.
A training session was carried out before the experiment,
where participants saw a moving red dot against a black back-
ground and experienced the stroking first on their left back (15 s).
This was followed by an auditory cue for a Mental Ball Dropping
(MBD) Task (adapted from Lenggenhager et al., 2009; Ionta et al.,
2011). The MBD task was used to measure self-location, by mea-
suring the modulation of the experimental conditions on the
judged time for an imaginary ball dropping from the participants’
hand to reach the floor. First, participants pressed a button to
indicate that they imagined releasing the ball from their hand
(which was positioned close to the body at level with partici-
pants lying on the back). Secondly, participants held the button
depressed during imagined ball dropping, and released the but-
ton to indicate that they imagined the ball hitting the floor. Button
press duration (i.e., RT) were shown to be a sensitive measure of
participants self-location in previous work (Lenggenhager et al.,
2009).
Participants then performed a Speeded Tactile Reaction task.
Tactile processing at different locations of the body was mea-
sured by a novel approach modified from the Temporal Order
Judgments (TOJ) task, which showed that the RHI slowed tactile
processing (Moseley et al., 2008). For the task in this experiment,
participants’ reaction times to vibration stimuli on four locations
(left and right back and left and right leg) were tested. Each tactile
vibrator was placed 5 cm laterally from themidpoint of the robot’s
stroking range. Participants felt four tactile vibrations (100ms
duration) at four different locations in random order during
each trial, with random inter-stimulus intervals (0.5, 1, and 1.5 s)
between vibrations. Participants were told to respond immedi-
ately each time they felt a vibration. Their RTs at the different
locations were compared to a baseline measured in 40 practice
trials (10 times at each location) before the actual experiment to
correct for differences in tactile processing at different regions of
the body. This procedure was repeated twice during the training
session, with participants experiencing the stroking on their left
leg during the second trial. Participants indicated their under-
standing of the tasks after the training session before proceeding
on to the main experiment.
In each trial, participants were subjected to 40 s of stroking by
the robotic device and observed a synchronous stroking pattern
on a virtual body through the HMD. The stroking was applied on
either their left back or left leg in each trial and participants were
presented a synchronous movement of a red dot on either the left
back or left leg of the virtual body (Figure 1). They were imme-
diately prompted by an audio cue for a mental ball-drop and
given 5 s to respond, followed by a Speeded Tactile Reaction task
lasting 7 s. Each of the four experimental conditions (observed
congruent back and leg stroking, observed incongruent back, and
leg stroking) was presented five times in a single block, over two
blocks (Figure 2).
The four conditions presented were spatially congruent back-
stroking, spatially congruent leg-stroking, spatially incongruent
back-stroking and spatially incongruent leg-stroking. The order
of conditions was randomized for every block.
After having completed the experiment on the robotic device
participants completed a questionnaire at the end of the exper-
iment on a visual analogue scale (VAS) with scores ranging
from −3 (absolutely NOT applicable) to +3 (absolutely applica-
ble) pertaining to the two conditions, congruent, and incongru-
ent stroking. All participants were aware of the difference between
the two conditions. Questions weremodified from (Lenggenhager
et al., 2009; Ionta et al., 2011) and inquired about illu-
sory touch, self-identification, and also contained control items
(Figure 3).
Finally, participants were asked to give free verbal responses
related to their sensations during the experiment. For each
response they gave they were then prompted by the experi-
menter to reveal if this sensation was different for the congruent
and incongruent conditions and if it differed for the locations
of visuo-tactile stroking during the congruent condition (i.e.,
back-back vs. leg-leg). Responses were written down by the
experimenter.
ANALYSIS
Self-identification questionnaire ratings were analyzed with
2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA with Congruence (congru-
ent/incongruent) and Question (Q1–5) as factors. Fisher’s Least
Significant Difference (LSD) analysis with threshold at p < 0.05
was used for all post-hoc comparisons. For presentation purposes
the scale was then transformed into positive units resulting in a
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FIGURE 2 | Experimental paradigm and factorial design. (A) Experimental
procedure of each trial (top), each block (20 trials-middle), and full experiment
(two blocks-bottom). (B) Factorial design of the experiment: The four panels
show different visuo-tactile stroking conditions. Participants lay supine and
received tactile stroking on the back or leg (red dot and arrow represent
tactile stroking range). Participants observed a virtual body (vertical body) and
viewed visual stroking on the back or the leg as a movement of a red dot
(vertical line marks the extent of visual stimulation and was not presented to
participants). Note that the viewed virtual body was aligned in the same plane
as the participants’ body and is rotated for presentation purposes only.
scale of 1–7 corresponding to the −3 (absolutely NOT applicable)
to +3 (absolutely applicable) originally measured.
Processing of RTs from the MBD task included removing
dataset outlier values exceeding two standard deviations from
the participant’s mean for each individual. Condition average
RTs for four experimental conditions were calculated and statisti-
cally analyzed with a 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA with fac-
tors Visual stimulation location (back/leg) and Stroking location
(back/leg).
Processing of RTs for the Speeded Tactile Reaction Task con-
sisted of removing for each individual dataset outlier values
exceeding two standard deviations from the participant’s mean.
These were analyzed with 2 × 2 × 4 repeated measures ANOVA
with factors tactile stimulation location (left and right back, left
and right leg), Visual stimulation location (back/leg), Stroking
location (back/leg).
Temperature data during the 40 s (20 time points) of stroking
were analyzed by means of independent repeated measures 2 ×
2 × 4 ANOVA for each time point (1-20), with Visual stim-
ulation location (back/leg), Stroking location (back/leg), and
Thermometer location (left and right back, left and right leg)
as factors. Changes in temperature (T) were calculated by
subtracting the skin temperature at the start of stroking (time
point 1) from all subsequent time points (time point 2–20) for
each trial. Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons was
used for statistical analysis of temperature.
Overall changes in temperature were analyzed using a
repeated measures 2 × 2 ANOVA with Visual stimulation loca-
tion (back/leg) and Stroking location (back/leg) as factors.
This was done once for the time period corresponding to the
onset of the illusion as well as for the overall experimental
epoch.
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FIGURE 3 | Questionnaire ratings for Q1-5 (mean ± standard error). N = 22. ∗ Indicates p < 0.002, and ∗∗ indicates p < 0.0001.
For the analysis of temperature data, five participants were
excluded from the analysis due to movements during the exper-
iment which displaced the thermocouples. For the MBD task,
outliers were discarded (total loss, 1.4% of trials, out of which
1 participant, whose mean reaction times were over 3 s, was
excluded from analysis). For the analysis of RTs for the Speeded
Tactile Reaction Task Trials outliers were removed (total loss,
<1% of trials).
RESULTS
SELF-IDENTIFICATION
Subjective responses are shown in Figure 3 and revealed stronger
self-identification with the virtual body for congruent ver-
sus incongruent conditions [Q2: It felt as though the body
I saw was as if it were my body; congruent trials M =
3.36, SE = 0.39; than incongruent trials: M = 2.36, SE = 0.33;
F(1, 21) = 7.21, p = 0.013]. There was also a significant congru-
ence effect for Q4 (The stroking felt as though it was located
on the body I saw) [F(1, 21) = 34.22, p < 0.001], indicating
illusory touch for the viewed body for the congruent condi-
tion (M = 4.7, SE = 0.36) that was larger than in the case
of the incongruent condition (M = 2.7, SE = 0.35). The ques-
tions related to changes in self-location (Q1 and Q3) as well as
the control question (Q5) showed no differences between the
conditions.
SELF-LOCATION
Statistical analysis of RTs from the MBD task showed a trend for
an interaction between visual and tactile input locations on par-
ticipants’ perception of self-location [F(1, 20) = 3.65, p = 0.07].
Post-hoc comparisons revealed that participants had shorter RTs
during the congruent condition (M = 872ms, SE = 5ms) than
in the incongruent condition (M = 884ms, SE = 5ms, p =
0.03). When examining all visual and tactile stroking locations
the back-congruent condition (M = 860ms, SE = 5ms) showed
faster reaction times as compared to the incongruent leg-stroking
condition (M = 890ms, SE = 5ms) (p < 0.01). This result indi-
cates a change in self-location between congruent and incongru-
ent conditions. No other effect was found for visual and tactile
interaction (all p > 0.2).
TEMPERATURE CHANGES
No significant differences in temperature were found for the dif-
ferent measurement locations (left/right leg, left/right back p =
0.8 n.s.). There were no significant interactions between tempera-
ture measurement location and the other factors (all p > 0.25)
at any of the 20 time points. This indicated that the cooling
effect (see below) was not linked to any specific location of mea-
surement. Hence, the measurements from all four locations were
averaged.
Analysis of the temperature changes showed a strong effect of
visual-tactile congruency on skin temperature [F(1, 18) = 70.115,
p < 0.001] with lower skin temperature in the congruent condi-
tion (M = −0.0066, SE = 0.00064) than in the incongruent con-
dition (M = −0.00007, SE = 0.0002). The effect of location of
stroking showed a trend [F(1, 18) = 3.7881, p = 0.06] with lower
temperature when the back was stroked (M = −0.0037, SE =
0.0004) than when the leg was stroked (M = −0.0029, SE =
0.0002). Finally the interaction between congruency and stroking
location was also significant [F(1, 18) = 55.268, p < 0.001]. Post-
hoc Bonferroni tests indicated that this interaction was driven
primarily by a large temperature difference between the back
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FIGURE 4 | Temperature data in all conditions. Temperature changes across four locations and across all time points (mean ± standard error). N = 17.
congruent (back-back) and back incongruent (back-leg) condi-
tions (see Figure 4).
We then analyzed the evolution of the temperature changes
over time. A separate ANOVA was conducted for each of the
measured time points of the temperature data (see methods),
hence removing any autocorrelations between timepoints. This
revealed a significant effect of the interaction for visual and tac-
tile stimulation location (e.g., back-back) starting from the 12th
time point to the 20th time point (24–40 s of stroking) on the
temperature [F(1, 16) = 4.89, p = 0.042] (Figure 5 and Table S2A,
for individual statistics at each time point). Post-hoc tests indi-
cated that this interaction was driven by a significant reduction
of skin temperature in congruent versus incongruent conditions
for all measurement locations [F(1, 16) = 70.11, p < 0.001]. We
performed a permutation test on a binary vector containing 12
zeros and 8 ones (see Methods) to determine the probability of
obtaining 8 consecutive significant time points within a 20 time
point set. Within the simulated distribution of 1,000,000 permu-
tations, only 94 occurrences of 8 consecutive time points occurred
by chance, suggesting a p-value of 0.000094. There was no main
effect of visual stimulation location, nor tactile stimulation loca-
tion or skin temperature measurement location on changes in
temperature throughout the 20 time points [F(1, 16) = 0.26, p =
0.84] (see Table S2B, for individual statistics at each time point).
As the time course analysis indicated that the temperature
change evolved over time we repeated the analysis for the overall
temperature change and restricted it to the later epoch (24–40 s)
of the trial. The results for the temperature change during this
epoch showed larger differences and can be viewed in Figure S1.
SPEEDED TACTILE REACTION TASK
Results from the speeded tactile reaction task revealed no effects
or interactions for visual stimulation, stroking, and location of
vibration stimuli (left and right back, left and right leg) (all
p > 0.1).
FREE RESPONSES
Free responses from subjects who reported bodily sensations
(12/22) were collected and revealed that the congruent back stim-
ulation was more pleasant than the congruent leg stimulation.
DISCUSSION
The present data revealed a continuous widespread decrease in
skin temperature during the time course of the FBI.We found that
the temperature decrease was not specific to the site of measure-
ment, showing similar effects in all locations despite the consider-
able distance between the measurement locations. Furthermore,
the present results show that anatomically congruent and tem-
porally synchronous stimulation of the legs can induce a FBI.
Additionally, we show that temporal synchrony between the visual
and the tactile cue is not sufficient for inducing the FBI but an
anatomical congruence of the visual and tactile stimulations is
also required.
Subjective responses recorded via questionnaires and free
responses are in accord with previous works using temporal syn-
chrony manipulation (Lenggenhager et al., 2009; Ionta et al.,
2011). These revealed that illusory self-identification with the
visual virtual body (Q2) and illusory touch of the visuo-tactile
event (Q4) were stronger in the congruent conditions. In their
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FIGURE 5 | Temperature time course data. Temperature changes across
four locations during 40 s of stroking for all conditions. Blue and Red lines
represent temperature changes between congruent and both incongruent
conditions, respectively. ∗ indicate locations of significant differences
between congruent and incongruent conditions (individual ANOVA, p < 0.05,
Bonferoni corrected). N = 17.
free responses most participants reported a stronger effect of
illusory self-identification during congruent back-stroking trials
as compared to congruent leg-stroking trials. Some responses
include: “Back stroking led to a more effective way of think-
ing of the virtual body as a real body” and “Back-congruent
condition was more pleasant and the feeling of my body being
the virtual body was stronger for the back stroking than for leg
stroking.”
Previous findings of participant’s subjective feeling of own-
ership for a rubber hand or virtual body (as determined from
responses to questionnaires) have shown differences between syn-
chronous and asynchronous visual-tactile stimulations. These
typically show stronger ownership for the fake body or body
part in temporally synchronous conditions than temporally
asynchronous conditions. However, it has been argued that
these effects may be driven by a strong sensation of dis-
ownership for the body in the asynchronous condition. For
instance, a study with 131 participants showed an ownership
rating at +0.4 for synchronous conditions, but a larger neg-
ative magnitude of −1.2 for asynchronous conditions (Longo
et al., 2008). As such, de Vignemont (2010), posits that the
sense of ownership experienced by participants during syn-
chronous stroking could possibly reflect participants’ confidence
in their judgment instead, with participants being more certain
that the rubber hand did not belong to them in the asyn-
chronous condition. The current study carefully controlled the
synchrony of stroking—by means of a robotic system com-
bined with VR—ensuring visual and tactile synchrony through-
out all conditions and across different distant stimulation sites;
hence the effects shown here are not related to a sense of
disownership caused by temporally asynchronous stimulation.
This extends the previous findings to suggest that anatomi-
cal congruence even in the absence of temporal conflicts is
an important factor for illusory self-identification (as tested
here), and potentially also for hand ownership as tested in
the RHI.
Objective physiological measurements of participants’ skin
temperature indicated a cooling of the skin which was significant
after 24 s of congruent visuo-tactile stimulation. Importantly,
these changes (illusory self-identification, and cooling) were
absent or weaker during incongruent stimulation. The present
findings extend previous findings of cooling of skin temperature
during illusory hand ownership (Moseley et al., 2008; Kammers
et al., 2011). It has been suggested that the cooling of skin
temperature during bodily illusions relates to a modulation of
homeostatic activity due to a change in body representation.
The alteration of the normal body representation by the illu-
sion has been suggested to induce a “disownership” of the true
body part, leading to a modulation of skin temperature, tac-
tile processing (Moseley et al., 2008), pain thresholds (Hänsel
et al., 2011), and even histamine reactivity (Barnsley et al., 2011).
However, these previous studies have shown anatomically spe-
cific changes in line with the localized effects of the RHI. In
the current study, and contrary to previous results the induc-
tion of the FBI resulted in a widespread temperature change in
all four measured locations (legs and back). This is in accord
with previous findings showing that despite localized visuo-tactile
stimulation (on the back), the induced self-identification and
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self-location effects indicate changes encompassing the full body.
The FBI has also demonstrated more flexible parameters than
the RHI for self-identification with a false body. For instance,
both male and female participants experience the same degree
of illusion with the use of a male virtual avatar (Ionta et al.,
2011) or male mannequin (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008); fur-
thermore the FBI can be induced for different viewpoints and
different spatial distances between stroked and seen body (Ionta
et al., 2011; Petkova et al., 2011). The RHI has been shown to
be more restricted to specific spatial configurations (Costantini
and Haggard, 2007; Lloyd, 2007). Our results build on these find-
ings to suggest that the body representation is malleable enough
to experience an illusion of the whole body, even when stroking
is applied to the back or to the legs. While not measured in
the current experiment, we speculate that this difference may
be related to the difference in the size (or somatosensory recep-
tor density) of the tactile receptive fields on the back/leg versus
the hand (Gardner, 1988; Nakamura et al., 1998; Kurth et al.,
2000). The larger receptive fields on the back and leg regions allow
only a much coarser somatosensory resolution which may in turn
lead to a less spatially specific and hence more global illusion
resolution.
While not tested in this experiment, a possible mechanism
for the effects of illusory self-identification on body tempera-
ture, brought about by visuo-tactile manipulation, could involve
the insula, which is known to be one of the centers of activation
during cross-modal visual and somatosensory activation (Bottini
et al., 1995; Hadjikhani and Roland, 1998). The insula has also
been found to be the main cortical substrate involved in dis-
criminating innocuous thermal sensation (Craig et al., 2000),
thermal regulation (Maihöfner et al., 2002) and is also found
to play a critical role in the sense of limb ownership (Baier
and Karnath, 2008; Karnath and Baier, 2010). It has thus been
postulated to be the key neural substrate that mediates the influ-
ence of temperature on interoceptive processes (Kang et al.,
2011).
It is noteworthy to mention that changes in body tempera-
ture found in the present study were highly significant, but very
small (i.e., in the range of 0.006–0.014◦C); those reported in the
original experiment by Moseley [and as measured by a hand-
held thermometer device (Rayek)] were larger and around 0.24◦C
(Moseley et al., 2008 Exp. 1–3). There are several methodolog-
ical differences between both experiments which may account
for the discrepancies. First, the experiment by Moseley used the
RHI as opposed to a FBI which may be associated with different
temperature effects. In the previous RHI experiment the cool-
ing effects were found for the hand which may have different
thermal variation than the back and thigh that were measured
in the present experiment. Also, in Moseley’s experiment, tem-
perature was recorded by means of a hand-held thermometer
with readings every 30 s for 7–8min, giving five readings for
each location (stimulated hand, unstimulated hand, and ipsilat-
eral ankle) in each trial. Here, we used a 4-channel thermometer
with thermocouples as temperature sensors to record tempera-
ture every 2 s for 40 s, giving 20 readings for each location in
each trial. The constant recording of temperature throughout
the experiment allowed for the collection of a more continuous
and well-controlled dataset, enabling a rigorous analysis of the
temperature changes induced by the illusion. Finally, the shorter
trial durations may also have affected the magnitude of the
temperature change, as the trials in our experiment were con-
siderably shorter than those used by Moseley et al. (40 s vs.
7–8min). In Moseley et al. (2008) the temperature changes after
24 s (Figure 1B) are of a similar magnitude to those reported
here, and the peak temperature change is found after about
4min of stroking. Thus, the temperature change observed in our
experiment may not have reached its asymptote in our shorter
trails.
With a continuous temperature measurement at a high sam-
pling rate, this study offers novel evidence, based on objective
measurements, of the onset of physiological changes associated
with illusory self-identification with a virtual body. Differences
in skin temperature during the four conditions occurred from
the start of stroking, with the gradual temperature change of
the skin during both congruent trials, and minor fluctuations
of temperature during incongruent trials. However, the differ-
ences among the conditions only became significant after 24 s
of stroking. Previous research has shown that bodily illusions
require time for their induction [i.e., ∼11 s for the RHI (Ehrsson
et al., 2004; Kammers et al., 2009)]. Therefore, we predicted
that the temperature change would show similar dynamics and
would require some time for induction. This is also in line
with the findings of the Moseley et al. (2008) paper showing
that the temperature change evolved over several minutes in the
RHI (Moseley et al., 2008) (Figure 1B). These findings suggest
that the psychological feeling of illusory self-identification dur-
ing the FBI may be linked to the increasing magnitude of a
widespread cooling of the body (at least with respect to those
body parts sampled in the present study). We have argued ear-
lier (Blanke, 2012) that differences in bodily self-consciousness
between RHI and FBI might be related to the relevance of
the stroked body regions for a global representation of the
bodily self. Specifically, peripheral body regions might be less
crucial than trunk regions for global aspects of the bodily
self.
The measurement of self-location using the MBD task showed
that participants had shorter RTs during congruent visuo-tactile
stroking conditions. This result indicates a change in perceived
self-location between the same conditions that were associated
with changes in body temperature and self-identification with
the virtual body. Neuroimaging experiments directly compar-
ing visuo-tactile conflicts with and without temporal mismatch
are necessary to investigate how changes in self-location map
to changes in illusory self-identification and temperature change
(Lenggenhager et al., 2009; Ionta et al., 2011).
CONCLUSIONS
The findings of the current study have important implica-
tions for the understanding of bodily self-consciousness. They
demonstrate for the first time that changes in full body self-
consciousness induced by synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation
relate to systematic and successive changes in skin temperature.
Contrary to results from the RHI, these temperature changes are
widespread and involve a cooling which spreads to both sides of
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the body as well as to regions anatomically distant from the
stimulated region. These findings are compatible with the the-
sis that the FBI alters more global aspects of bodily self-
consciousness as compared to the more local and limb-specific
changes induced by the RHI (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). This
extends previous findings regarding differences in the behav-
ioral and neural mechanisms of the FBI and RHI (Ehrsson
et al., 2004; Ionta et al., 2011) suggesting that the sense of
ownership over a limb and the full body may be quite dif-
ferent. Additionally, our results show that temporally syn-
chronous stimulation between a seen body part and a differ-
ent, touched body part is not sufficient for the induction of
illusory self-identification with a virtual body and cooling of
one’s own body; temporally synchronous stimulation needs to
be applied with an anatomical congruency. Our results high-
light that the sense of ownership is a spatially multifaceted
experience affecting both explicit as well as implicit bodily
measures.
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